Since many years,the training of imams has been put at the centerofthe policyagenda in several Europeanc ountries.B ecause in Belgium religion classes are part of the compulsoryprogram of pupils,the training of imams is coupled with the training of professors of religion. Recently,p roposals to organize theset rainings by universities have been submitted to the political arena. These proposals aim at introducing, on the one hand, classes of French and Dutch languages and, on the other hand, classes on Belgian society and legislations.Assuch an issue is under the competence of regions,debates and proposals diverge significantly in Flanders and in the French-speaking part of the country. Thep aper analyzes the challengesf or dealing with this issue in the two parts of the country. It analyzes the positions, the controversies and the proposals of state and nonstate actors involvedinthis debate.T he author stresses how the state plans to organize these trainings and how the state justifies its interventioni na ni ssue that is usually a domain of competence of thehierarchy of the "Church"orthe self-organization of the Islam.
Introduction
Formany years,the training of Muslim leaders (imams,teachers of Islamic religious education,Muslim counselors) has been on the political agenda in Belgium. At present no training program for Muslim leaders has been formulatedb ythe representative body of the Muslim faith,t he Muslim Executive of Belgium (MEB), or submitted by them for recognition by the public authorities.Itfollows that in the absenceofsuch aprogram, the Muslim community has no institutions for the purpose of leadershipt raining, unlikeo ther recognized religions and secularist organizations. Thel ack of this instrument creates an unjustified inequality between the religions and, in addition,c ontributes to ac limate of suspicion and distrust on the part of the public authorities towards some imams,who are considered as potentially able to feed the growth of fundamentalism. In order to respond to this problematic situation,the Belgian state has taken initiative to bring leadership training programs into existence in collaboration with the MEB. Thequestion of the legitimacy of state involvement immediately arises given that the Belgian Constitution guarantees the separation of state and religion. This paper puts forward an analysisofhow Muslim leadership training is being developed in Belgium. Theanalysis describes the model put in place and the path that led to the current situation, as well as explaining the main factors that led to this particular outcome. Given that the question of training is dependent on the relationship between the state and religions,the paper will first of all analyze this relationship and the specific question of the recognition of the Muslim faith. It will then analyze how the state has been able to justifyits involvement by exploiting the possibilitiesoffered by the Constitution and the organizational weaknesses of the Muslim communities.
Themain thesis is that Belgian state intervention in the training of Imams and teachers of Islamic religious education is justified primarily by alogic of security that treats training for imams as an instrument to combat Muslim fundamentalism,g uarantee public order and help to build an European Islam. It is thus control, rather than the improved educational standards,the main objective of the policy.Other factors contributingtostate intervention are the climate of Islamophobia, fragmentation of the Muslim community and the weakleadership of the officially recognized representation of Muslims,t he MuslimE xecutive of Belgium.
This analysis touches upon the issue of institutional responses to religious diversity in three ways.F irstly,t he analysis recognizes that the institutional arrangements between the state and religious communities are key in shaping the national response to the problematic of training Imams. Secondly,the paper pays close attention to the institutions that represent the Muslim community and how the specific form of institutionalization that emergedi nB elgiumi nfluences the policy on training of imams.Thirdly,the paper also highlights how the particular solutionchosen impacts on institutions of the host society,inparticular the university,w hich acquires an important role as ac o-producer of the new policy together with the state,I slamic associations and the Musliml eadership.A tt he end, governments at the federal and regionallevel set up Commissions madeupof representatives of Muslim communities,r epresentatives of the universities,a nd expertss howing the central role played by meso-level institutions on this issue.
The relationship between religions and the state in Belgium
In 1831, the Constituent Assembly settled the basisfor the politics of religion in Belgium. TheBelgian constitution establishes freedom of religion and of public worship (article 19), and also the freedom not to practice any religion (article 20) . It also provides for the independence of religion in respect of the state (article 16), specifically by forbiddingthe state to interfere in the appointment of ministers of religion or to preventc orrespondence between ministers of religion and their superiors.Intermsoffinance,article 181 of the Constitution provides that salaries and pensionsofministersofreligion are paid by the state and registered annually in its budget. This measure was taken to compensate for the confiscation of goods from the Catholic Church during the revolutionary period and for the abolition of varioussources of income,which had previously been paid to the Church. Apart from this,t he communes took financial responsibility for the maintenance of religious buildings (Catholic churches,synagogues and Protestant churches).
Themodel chosen is both close to and distant from the French Concordat of 1801. It is relatively close in its acceptance that the "social utility of religion" (de Coorebyter2005) consists essentially in the maintenance of the established order. However, the model is distant fromthe French Concordat becausethe latterset up mechanisms of control of religion which werenot copied in Belgium (Tihon 2005) . They oung Belgian state thus put in place ar elativelyg enerous funding system,but without attaching meansofcontrol as the State does not control the Church expenditure,w hich made the system completely original for its time (Sägesser /deCoorebyter 2000) . This particular system resultedfrom the unionist spirit at the time of independence between the two main pillars (Lijphart 1981) of the Belgian state:liberals,who were essentially secularist, and Catholics.So, from the beginning, the young Belgian state funded religion in the framework of a policy aiming to guarantee social order, reinforce public morality,and build respect for the law,p roperty,g oods and persons (de Coorebyter2 005). In return, recognized religions were protected and funded.W ith this model, Belgium avoidedc hoosing between as tate-controlled,s tate-financed Church and af ree Church withnopublic funding.
Therecognition of the Catholic,Protestant and Jewish religions predated independence. TheAnglican religion was recognized at the time of the adoptionof the law of 4 th March 1870 which distinguished between the temporal and spiritual aspectsofareligion. Only the temporal aspect of areligionisofficially recognized and financedbythe state.Althoughthereisnolaw establishingthe conditions for ar eligion to be recognized, fourc riteria are traditionally used by the state:a ) having aminimum numberofadherents,b)being structured in such away as to have ar epresentative body which canr epresent the religion concerned in its relations with the state,c)being established in the countryfor asufficient length of time and d) being of social benefit and not carrying out any activities which are harmful to public order (Sägesser /deCoorebyter 2000) .
Therepresentative body is responsible for the temporal administration of the religion. Founded principally on the institutional structureo ft he Catholic Church, the criteria of having arepresentativebody poses problems to religions which are less centralized than Catholicism. It is expected of the representative body that it should bring together as manyaspossible of the local communities of the religion concerned.T he recognition of religions has therefore led the Protestants and the Jews to create administrative structures allowingcontact with the public authorities,the Administrative Council of the Protestant and Evangelical Religion and the Jewish Central Consistory of Belgium, respectively.
This model of organization of the relations between religions and the state has continued without fundamental change up to the present, showing astrong salience of path dependency(Piersons 1994). Thefundingofreligions has been organized on the basisofinstruments created in the early 19 th century. Therecognition of new religions such as Islam in 1974, Orthodoxyin1985 and more recently the financingo fs ecularist organizations in 1993 extendedt he model. Nevertheless,achange took place following the Schools Pact of 1958. Article 24 of the Constitution, as interpreted in al aw of 1959, provides that public schools must offer pupils the choice,throughout the whole of their compulsory education, of classesinany one of the recognized religions or in non-confessional ethics.T he representative body of each religion is to put forward to the state its nominations of teachers of religious education.
Thus,each religion must have arepresentativebody,whose principal tasks are: a) to nominate ministers of religion, religious counselors (to hospitals,prisons,the army etc.),teachers and inspectors of religious education, etc. (Beumier 2006 and Sägesser2 012);t oo rganize training for these various professional groups, b) to put forwardlocal communities (churches,mosques,etc.) to the public authorities for recognition, and c) to validatethe religious education program.
In 2001, Belgian federalism also went through ac hange in the division of powers between differentlevels of government. Thefederal state has jurisdiction firstly over the recognition of religions and their representative bodies and secondly over the creation of paid positionsfor ministers of religion, also over their salaries andp ensions and those of delegates from secularist organizations.T he regionsh ave jurisdiction over the recognition of places of worship (churches, mosques,etc.). Communes (for Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and Anglicanism)a nd provinces (for Islam and Orthodoxy) make financial contributions for the maintenance of places of worship and provide housing for ministers of religion. To coordinate the recognition of places of worship by the region and the creationo fp aid positions for ministers of religion at federall evel, consultation mechanismshave been put into place between thedifferent levels of government.
There is thusadegree of consensus in Belgium regarding, on the one hand, the social utility of "communities of conviction", whether religious or not,asameans of morala nd spirituals upport for the population;a nd on the other hand, the principle of public funding for these communities.Asfor the dimension of "public order",t his has become increasingly important since the end of the twentieth century. Theprimary concern is no longer Catholicism, as it was in the nineteenth century, but Islam.T he Belgian legal framework has allowed the recognition of Islam and its integration using existing policy instruments,w ithout the need to search for new methods of intervention. At the same time,Islam has had to adapt to integrate into the system:the organization of Muslim communities,the iden-tification and specific role of ministers of religion, the contribution to social cohesion and to "religious peace".
The recognition of Islam
Ther ecognition of Islam was established by law on 19 July 1974. However,t he institutionalizationofthe recognition of Islam was slowtotake effect. An operating subsidy was not granted to ar epresentative body of Islam until the mid1990s and the first salaries for imamswere not paid until 2006, which was also the year that the first mosques were officially recognized. Only the organization of Islamicr eligious education in public schools was achieved rapidly,f rom [1975] [1976] . Thet ime elapsed from the recognition of Islam to the implementation of that recognition is largely due to the wide diversity of Muslim communities and the mutualdistrust between these communities and the government. As in other countries (Fetzer /Soper 2005; Husson /Dury 2006; Potz /Wieshaider 2004) , the Belgian authorities have been confronted with the difficulty of identifying a representative and uncontestedinterlocutorfor the variousMuslim communities.
From the beginning, the question of the recognitionofarepresentative body for the Muslim religion has been at the heart of the political debate (Kanmaz 2002; Sägesser /Torrekens 2008) . Thestate has found it very difficult not to exceed its authority in the matter. In 1978, the state grantedthe temporal management of the religion to the Islamic and CulturalCenter (ICC), the main interlocutor with Belgian public authorities well before the official recognition of Islam. This institution playedacentral role in the organization of the first Islamic religious education classesi np ublics chools.D espite beingt he product of diplomatic agreements between Belgium and Saudi Arabia, the ICC was distrusted by the political parties due to its joiningthe World Islamic League in 1982 and due to the fear of Islam which becamew idespread in public opinion during the 1980s (Bastenier /Dassetto 1987) . In 1985, the MinisterofJustice,Jean Gol, drew up a Royal Decree creating aHigh Council of Muslims for Belgium, to be responsible for the temporal management of Islamiccommunities.T he objective of this law was to replace the Islamic and CulturalCenter,which was too controversial and unrepresentative,byabody which would be representative of Islam in Belgium. This proposed legislation was rejected by the Council of State because the Constitution does not authorize the government to act on its own authority to create an institution responsible for representingb elievers (Blaise /d eC oorebyter 1993) .
In 1989, the Royal Commissariat on Immigrant Policy (RCIP) was set up to give advice on an inclusive integration policy.Inits first report, the RCIP(1989) proposed the creation of ademocratically elected and representative organization for Islam in Belgium whichw ould be the interlocutor with the state.T his High Council of Muslims for Belgium shouldb em ade up of representatives elected throughthe mosques and coopted representatives.This proposal, which provoked much controversy,was not adoptedbythe government. In March 1990, the government relievedt he Islamic and CulturalC enter of its powers to nominate teachers of religiouseducation and in June 1990 it created aProvisionalCouncil of Elders to serve for two years.T hisc ouncil was given the task of submitting a proposal to the government for the creation of arepresentative leadership body. Thes tate was able to create this council because the council was not itself a leadership body but ak ind of consultative council of which the members appointedb yt he government were more representative of the lobby groups of Belgian society rather than the diversity of Muslims in Belgium (Renaerts 1996) . This council was never accepted by Muslims.Animportant task of the council was the handling of urgent business,especially the nomination of teachers of religious education. On this matter, there was am arked difference of views between the Moroccansa nd the Tu rks.T he former preferred to nominate people settled in Belgium, whereas the latter preferred to bring teachersf rom Tu rkey,t hereby following the approach of the Diyanet, the Tu rkish MinistryofReligious Affairs.
Meanwhile,the Islamic and CulturalCenterwas not inactive. On the basis of the proposal of the RCIP,itestablished an electoral procedure for the selection of religious representativest hrough the mosques. 300 000 Muslims participatedi n this process.T he elections were held in January 1991, but theirresults werenot valid because the state did not recognizethe process as this will be explainedlater. Nevertheless,itgave rise to the creationofaHigh Council of Muslims which was not recognized as interlocutor by the state.Inspite of this lack of recognition and the absenceo fc ontrolso ft he electoral procedure,t he authorities could not completely ignore this process of self-organization.
TheC enter for EqualO pportunitiesa nd Opposition to Racism (CEOOR), which succeeded the RCIP,found away through the impasse in 1993. They opened negotiations between the main factions of Islam in Belgium to enable the formation of aConstituent assembly,anauthority which the faithful would be able to recognize as legitimate (Blaise 1998) . It was set up in the spring of 1993 and was made up of 51 people.I te lected aM uslim Executive of Belgium (MEB) of 17 people who,after the MinisterofJustice gave approvalfor each of the individual members,was recognized by the government in 1994. Theprojectwas therefore built from the bottom up,b ut with steeringa nd controls by the state,a nd the essential involvement of abroker (Kingdon 1984) , the CEOOR. This MEB coexisted with the HighCouncil of Muslims created by the elections organized by the Islamic and Cultural Center in 1991. Thelatter ceased its activities particularly becausei ts president became the president of the MEB.T his body nominated teachers of religious education as well as religiousc ounselors for hospitals and prisons.Its work was monitored by the CEOOR.
On 12 June 1998, the Council of Ministers adopted the proposal to organize elections for the appointment of an ew Muslim Executive of Belgium. These elections took place on 13 December1998. An Assembly of 51 electedmembers and 17 co-opted members was to be established and to elect an executive,which was recognized as the leadership body.All Muslimsresident in Belgium for more than ayear were allowed to register on the electoral lists.The voting was carried out either in amosque or in apublic institution. Thecandidates were required to be at least 25 yearsold, to be resident in Belgium for at leastfive years,toenjoy civil rights,t ok now one of the official languages of the country,a nd not to be appointed to any political or diplomatic role.Inaddition, they were required to have ahigh schooldiploma. Of the 72 000 registered on the electoral lists,42000 cast av ote.T he result of the electionsw as confirmed on 9J anuary 1999 and in February an ew Muslim Executive of Belgium of 17 members (7 Moroccans,4 Tu rks,3other nationalities,a nd 3c onverts) was proposed to the Ministero f Justice.H owever one of the electedM oroccans was turned down following an unfavorable decisionb yS tate Security.T he screening imposed by the state brought about much ill feeling among Muslims,especially since there was no legal basis whatsoever for the screening and the criteria applied were never explained. Since this security check had no legal basis,anew law was adopted on 3May 2005 establishingprocedures for asecurity checkofmembers of the MuslimExecutive of Belgium, showing once again the security dimension inherenttothis specific policy.F urther elections took place in 2005, in ac limate of intense conflict between opposing currentsa tt he heart of the Muslim community.T he call for a boycott of these elections,predominantly on the Moroccan side,led to astrong overrepresentation of Tu rks among thoseelected to the new MEB.T oavoid the errors of the past and consolidate the achievements of the executive,the electoral processi n2 014 was based on ad ifferent procedure,c loser to that used by the Protestant and Jewish religions.Acharter of affiliation to the process of renewal was submitted to the 292 mosques in the country, and they all ratified it 1 .Ofthose, 284 sent delegates to the General Council of Muslims in Belgium. This General Council appointed 60 members to the General Assembly,who in turn appointed 15 members of the Executive,who co-opted two extramembers. Thenew executive has been in place since 30 March 2014.
Conditions of institutionalization
How was the transition achieved from the dramatizationo ff inding aM uslim representative body to its institutionalization? Theinitial problem resided in the lack of areligious hierarchy in Islam and the need for the state to have an interlocutor. However, the international and diplomatic approach whereby the state gave the role of leadership body to the Islamic and CulturalCenterdelayed the 1S ee "ProjetdeRenouvellement de lOrgane Repré sentatif du Culte Musulman en Belgique (ORCMB)" dated May 2010 -h ttp://mediation.blogs.lalibre.be/media/02/00/ 1782274688.pdf (24 July 2015). creationofagrouping or federation of mosques, in summary the self-organization of Islam in Belgium.Atthe same time, the fragmentation of local Muslim communities made an international resolution of the matter seem attractive.T he mosques,through their diversity and weak organization,allowed the Islamic and Cultural Center to have the monopoly of contact with the Belgian authorities. When the state in 1990 removed the body it had appointedinthe absence of an alternative,i tn ever considered allowingM uslims to put togetheral eadership body autonomously,and this was for reasons of ideology and of public security. Islam is an immigrant religion, and the fear of Islam has taken hold of Belgian public opinionsince 1986 2 .Since then, immigrants and Islam are considered potential"threats" which require state control.This security-oriented approach has never disappeared ever sincethe institutionalizationofthe MEB in 1999. This is demonstrated by the practice of screening elected delegates by State Security.The atmospherecontinues to be dominated by suspicion, and even more so since11 September 2001 (Bousetta 2002) and with the recentr adicalization of some Muslims.
Theconflictbetween the state and local Muslim communities was at its worst when the government relieved the Islamic and Cultural Center of its responsibilities and created the Provisional Council of Elders.D istrustingt he mosques,t he government didnt allowt hem any role in organizing their own religion. By setting up the Provisional Council of Elders,itcreated an interlocutor in its own image,and by doing so,itcut itself off from Muslims. Thestate showed contempt not only for the mosques but also for Muslims,bycreating an artificial body with no legitimacy whichundermined Muslim religious identity.
Thedelay in settling the matter wasalso due to alack of consensus at the heart of the political parties.T he liberala nd therefore secularist ministers who had responsibility for this issue during the 1980s rarely showed any conciliation towards the Muslimcommunities.The lack of apolitical solutionwas no problem for anyone except as mall marginalizedg roup,n amely the teachers of Islamic religious education who did not enjoy the same status as their colleagues from other religions,and the imams who still didnt receive astate salary.In1989, the RCIP proposal put the question backonthepolitical agenda althoughits substance was fiercely criticized, especially by liberal and socialist secularists.From when it was first set up,t he CEOOR took this issue in hand and took up am ediating role between the High Council of Muslims,unrecognized by the state,and the Minister of Justice.Although it was not in conformity with the law,the electoral procedure 2A fter American bombing on Tr ipoli resulting from increasing tensions between the United States and Libya, some Muslimsorganize in Brussels ademonstration on April 20th, 1986. During this demonstration,some Muslimsshout "Allah UAkbar" and raise portraits of Ayatollah Khomeiny and of Colonel Kaddhafi.F or the Belgian media,this was the starting point of the visibility of Muslim fundamentalism. (Dassetto /Bastenier 1987). of the High Council demonstrated ap olitical legitimacy which the government could not ignore.There therefore began aphase of negotiations which succeeded in creating the Constituent Assembly.T he Muslim Executive whichw as drawn from this constituentassembly was set up in October 1994 for aperiodofone year and was based on long negotiations amongst most of the factions present in the Muslim communities (CEOOR 1995) . TheCEOOR proposed apragmatic procedure to the Minister of Justice,w hich consisted in putting the working of the executive to the test, and evaluating their activities.
ThePresident of the Executive,previously the President of the High Council of Muslims, encouraged the democraticallye lected High Council to change its strategyi nr elation to the Belgian authorities and acceptt he mediation of the Center,because he realized that Islam was notregarded sympathetically by the Belgian population and that it would be better to pursue dialogue and negotiation. On the side of the political authorities,i tw as the directors of RCIP (Paula DHondt) and of CEOOR (Johan Leman), both close to the Flemish Christian Democratic Party,w ho pushed for progress with two Ministers of Justice successively,both of them also Christian Democrats.The Flemish Christian Democrat Minister, Stefan De Clerck,made the commitment to finding asolutionwhich would require both new elections and ar elative guarantee that religious extremists would be absent from the electedbody.Inother words,the government followed the guidelineso ft he proposal from the RCIP,w hich it had not been politically possible to implement at the time it was first put forward.
What led to the opening up of political opportunity?T hree factors were essential (Rea 2000) . Thef irst wast he most institutional elemento ft he representation of Islam, namely the attitudeofthe High Council of Muslims,elected but unrecognized. In its strategy it showed great pragmatism whichfits relatively well into the Belgian political ethosthat avoids French-style ideological conflict. In addition, the transition from confrontation to negotiation allowed the internal organization of the diversity within the Muslim communities.T actically, by choosing as president aBelgian convert,the Muslim Council disarmed racist and stigmatizing reactions.T he second factor was the essential role played by the RCIP and the CEOOR. Their work as brokers in this policy area between 1989 and 1998 allowed the creation of as pace for discussion between the Muslim leadersand the responsible politicians.However, their role was above all essential in changing the focus of this policy. TheFlemish ChristianDemocratindividuals leadingthese two institutions and the Christian Democrat Minister,bypresenting the policy in terms of the objective of immigrant integration, ratherthan in terms of recognition of ar eligion and therebyd eepening the traditional confessional cleavage of Belgian society,defused the most obviousobjectionsofthe secularists in regard to this matter.F inally,t he third, more structural factor was the transformation of immigrants into Belgian citizens.Between 1991 and 2012 more than 750.000 foreigners became Belgian, and especially in Brussels where 200.000 people with Moroccan and Turkish backgroundbecame Belgian 3 .T hesepeople are now ag roup of Belgian citizens of Muslim faith, Belgian citizens who undeniably have Muslim identity.T he growth in the numberso ft hose who have acquired Belgian nationality has stimulated something of acompetition between the political parties to attract this new electorate,i ncludingt hose parties which were the mostreluctant to recognizeaMuslim leadership body (the francophone socialists and the liberals). Since 1994, the number of Muslims elected to the parliamentary assembliesh as increased steadily and the voice of Belgians of Muslimfaith has grown more and more powerful (Jacobs et al. 2010 ).
Islam and Muslim leadership in Belgium
Islam became amajor religioninBelgium due to the arrival of immigrant workers at the beginning of the 1960s.A fter the signature of bilateral agreements with Morocco and Turkey in 1964, many immigrant workers from these two countries settled in the threeregions of Belgium. During the 1970s,family reunificationand the high birth rate of Moroccan and Turkish families led to arapid increase in the Muslim population. One of the features of Moroccan and Tu rkish immigration is that it did not cease when labor immigration was broughttoanend. More than 40 %o fn ew residence permits granted each year are connected to family reunification (CEOOR2 013). Among these new arrivals,t herea re many Moroccans and Tu rks who owetheir mobility to an international marriage.Moreover, there are also immigrants arrivingfrom other countries with aMuslim majority: Albania, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq. However,t he people coming from these countries mostly arrivei nB elgium as asylums eekers.I nt he absence of census figures fort he numbero fM uslims in Belgium,H ertogen( 2008) proposed a methodb ased on two indicators.H ei dentified the population having an immigration background from each Muslim countryand applied aweightingbased on a German survey measuring the proportion of people in Germany with that background who identified themselves as Muslim (74 %f or Tu rks,7 3% for Moroccans). His data is from the year 2010 (Husson /Mandin 2014) . Therecognized mosqueswhich belongtothe Diyanet do not apply for salaries for theirimamsfrom the federal state.T hey receive imams made available by the Diyanet to servet hree-year terms.T heseimams are paid by the Diyanet at amore generous level than that provided by Belgian legislation.T he Diyanet also makes financial contributions to its mosques and plays an important role in political representation. TheUnion of Muslims of Belgium (Rassemblement des Musulmans de Belgique) is an umbrella organizationthat coordinates the activities of mosques which are members of the MuslimE xecutive of Belgium (MEB) and promotes the training of new leaders,imamsand teachers.Itisessentially agrouping of Moroccan mosquesand it maintains privileged links with the highest political and religious Moroccan authorities.T here are other smaller umbrella organizations serving mosques accordingtotheir theological traditions or the nationality of theirmembers (Husson 2007; Husson/Dury 2006) .
Thefederal state finances 17 Muslim prison counselors. These Muslim counselors have been trained by the MEB for the religious dimension of their work and by public institutions for legal and social matters.H owever, the largest public contributioni st he salaries of teachers of Islamic religious education in state schools.There are almost 300 teachersemployed in state schools in Flanders and 400 in the francophone parto ft he country.F or almost 20 years,t he political debateonleadership training has centeredonteachers of Islamic religious education (Boender /Kanmaz 2002) . To meet the requirement to organizereligious education, from 1975 to 1990 the Islamic and CulturalCenter basically brought 5h ttp://www.embnet.be/MosquØes/tabid/594/Default.aspx. teachers in fromabroad who didnt speakany of the official languages of Belgium. Most of them did not have the required qualifications and were granted exemption from the usual requirements for reasons of urgency.During the 1990s,inthe absenceofarepresentative leadership body,anadvisory body appointedbythe state managed appointments of teachers of Islamicreligious education and limited the numbersofteachers arriving from abroad. Between1993 and 1997, the Flemish government created an evening course made up of classes in theology, teaching methodology and language. Theteachers who refused to take the exam were no longer employed. Thei nterventionism of the Flemish government was also demonstrated by the initiative taken to support aFlemish training scheme for teachers of Islamicr eligious education.S ince 1998, in collaboration with the MEB,the Erasmus University College has offered athree-year bachelor course for which students must studythree subjects,one of which is Islam. Thedesign and teaching of the course in Muslim theology and Koranicstudies are the responsibility of two teachers nominated by the MEB.T he principal challengew as to construct atraining coursefor future teachersofIslamic religious educationwith the MEB in collaboration with institutions of higher education.
In Wallonia-Brussels,there has not been acomparable experience.Most of the teachers have not had training in the study of religion and of Islam, except for the Tu rkish teacherswho were mostly trained in Turkey.Most of them have amasters degree from aBelgian university and adiploma of competence to teach Islamic religious education from the MEB. Theinstitutions of higher education and the MEB offerf urther training andp rofessional development conferences.S ince 2014, the MEBh as initiated discussions with the Theology Faculty of the UniversitØ Catholique de Louvain (UCL) withaviewtocreating an optioninIslamic religious educationaspart of the universitys teacher training course. Thedesign of the course programa nd the nomination of teachers of Islamic religious education depend on the MEB.Unlikewhat has happenedinFlanders, in thiscase there was no state-ledinitiative,but rather direct contact between the MEB and UCL. Apart from this,the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Islam in the Contemporary World at UCL has run acourseonIslamic religious studies since 2004, which also includes classes in theologyt aught by professors from abroad.
Whilethe MEB is the official interlocutoro ft he state,i ti sn ot ap ermanent base for academic study of Islam. Thet raining courses are offered on aone-off basis.The vision of the MEB is to set up auniversityfacultyofIslamic theology on the model of the universityfaculty of Protestant theology in Brussels,autonomous but recognized by the state.A tp resent the MEB is also in competition with trainingcourses organized by private institutions,some of which offer "university qualifications", which however are not officially recognized by the state. .T he target groups these institutions aim to provide for are imams, teachers of Islamic religious education and Muslimcounselors (Piqueray/Nonneman /T immerman 2009, p. 12-13) .
Thetraining of these three "professions" (imam, teacher of Islamic religious education and Muslim counselors) is constantly on the political agenda and at the heart of many political debatesand public initiatives. However,itisespecially the training of imams that is currently on the political agenda. Thepublic authorities are seekingt os upport the MEB in its vision of creating at raining centerf or Muslim leadership,but they are also launching initiativesinassociation with MEB to competewith the many private initiatives that are not controlled by the state and whose normative,religiousand political orientationsare suspect in the eyes of some politicians.H owever,acentral question remains,w hich is that of the legitimacy of state involvement to promote the emergence of atraining center for Islamicstudies centeredontheology.
Legitimacy of state involvement in the training of religious leaders
Thequestionofthe training of religious leaders is intimately linked to the question of the relationship between religions and the state.InBelgium, the state does not set any particular conditionsfor the training of ministers of religion, leaving religious bodies the responsibility for setting their own standards and requirements.This leads to awide varietyofapproaches from one religion to another and sometimes also within as ingle religion. This noninterference by the state in religious matters is historically arelativelyrecent phenomenon. In many European countries,systems of regulation of the training of religious leaders in general and ministers of religion in particular continuedu pt ot he nineteenth century,f or example the policy of Joseph II, Emperor of the Habsburg Empire ( Kossmann 1988, p. 54) or that of the consulate of NapolØon Bonaparte (Messner 2010) . Compliance with two principles justifies intervention by the state:ministers of religion mustc ontribute to the maintenance of "public order"a nd "religious peace". To achieve theseobjectives, ministers of religion must have good quality 7h ttp://www.faculte-islamique.be. 8h ttp://www.alkhayria.org. 9h ttp://www.centreislamique.be/en/homepage. training. Thequestion is alwaysinwhich aspect of the training should the state be involved:theological knowledge or social and civic training?T raining of Muslim leadersi so nt he political agenda mainly because of questions raised about compliance with these two principles.A fter 9/11 many reports,i ncluding some commissioned by the government, showed the dangers which could be stirred up by the teaching of some imams on the subjecto fm aintaining publico rder and religious peace,towhich was now added the fightagainst radicalism.
Thereport of the Commission of Intercultural Dialogue set up by the federal government, in February 2004, formulated recommendations for "living together". Amongt hese recommendations was the creation of aB elgian Institute of Islam and aCenter of Interfaith Studies to promote dialogue between religious, secularist and other traditions.This should be a"center of research and teaching where people could study on the one hand the methodsa nd rules of Islamic jurisprudence (ijtihaad, usul al fiqh) and the interpretation of religiouss ources (Koran and Sunnah), and on the other hand the socio-historic dimension of this juridical and theological heritage.T his center would combine academic and educational approaches" (Delruelle /T orfs 2005, p. 8). It would also be ap ublic meetingplace.However,the justification for this center restedonadouble-sided argument:p romoting the exchange betweend iverse currents within Islam and fighting against fundamentalism and radicalism. Ther eport once again makes clear the nonintervention of the state in religious affairs while adding, "That does not mean that religious freedom has no limits".
Whileone of the arguments justifying the possible interference of public authorities in the management of religion is that of maintenance of public order and religious peace,anew argument was put forward in the reportofthe Commission Responsible for the Statuso fM inisters of Recognized Religions 10 (2006). The involvement of the state could be justified on the grounds that the state finances ministers of religion who according to article 181 of the Constitution offer "moral assistance". This legal provisiona llows the state to expect certain "vocational skills". While article 21 of the Constitution forbids thestate to involve itself in the training of ministers of religion, article 181 does not forbid it to be concerned with the standards of training of ministers of religion, given that their salaries are justified in terms of "moral assistance". In addition to the two traditionala rgumentsrelevant to "religious policing" (Boudon2002), the reportadds this more instrumental argument. Because the state pays their salaries,ministers of religion have to meet "quality standards".T his argument ultimatelyl eads to proposing supervision of ministers of religion. Ther eport declares the commissions complete satisfaction with the standards of training in all religions except for Islam. It states thus:"the necessary requirements in respect of the training of imams are at times uncertain,and above all, the conditions under which this trainingiscarried out are altogether imprecise,disparate and, more seriously,badly adapted to the needs of the Muslim community of Belgium, according to the representatives heard by the commission" (p.32). Thec ommission therefore proposed the creation of Muslim theology colleges in Belgium responsiblef or the training of imams.
Political initiativesinFlanders
Following the reports of the two commissions,t he Flemish authorities went straighti nto action. Af irst report (Piqueray /N onneman/Timmerman 2008) consisted of afeasibility study on the provision of training for all Muslim leaders. Themain conclusions of the report showed the existence,amongstapart of the Muslim community,o ft he desire for a" Flemishi mams training course". The unstated understanding was that there is an essentialcommitment to have imams better trained than thosecurrently in office,bygiving them an academic training. However, the contenta nd the partnership involvedi nt he creation of this "Flemish imams training course" remained very vague.The report insisted on the necessity of receiving recognition from the MEB,t oo ffer aq ualification comparable to the high level courses available in countriessuch as Tu rkey and Morocco.T his proposal does not rule out the need to establish this course in consultation with the countries of origin.
TheF lemish government of 2009-2014 put this matter back on the political agenda. They wanted to achieve the result of aq ualification for imams in consultation with the representatives of the Islamic faith
11
.Assooften, the government proceeded in two steps.F irstlyt hey commissioned as tudy carried out by Debeer, Loobuyck &Meier (2011) in ordertorefinethe analysis of the training of imams, in particular in acomparative European perspective,and secondly they set up acommission to make recommendations to the government. Thecommission was made of members of ministerial cabinets ("Educationa nd Training"a nd "Citizenship and Integration"), representatives from the universities and representatives of the Muslim community,includingthe MEB.The commission had the task of defining the training needs forM uslim leaders and proposing possible organizationalstructures for a"Flemish imams training course". Given the difficulties involved, the commission suggested that the work should proceed in stages.
In the short term, they proposed investment in the training of Muslim leadership at an academic level by offering them aspecific teacher training course.In the medium term, it would be advisable to invest in professionalization programs for imamscurrentlyactive in Flanders,bymaking use of Dutch language courses, by developing non-religious higher education courses for imams, and by devel-oping citizenship courses for imams.T he memorandumt ot he Flemish government 12 specified that "the professionalization programs have the objective of supporting currentministers of religion in order to strengthen theirties with the society in which they live and work". Finally,i nt he long term, the commission suggested investing in acomplete university courseinIslamic religious studies and facilitating the collaboration betweenhigher education and the Flemishimams trainingcourse.
Since 2014, courses in Islamic studies have begun to be offered at university level. TheKatholiek Universiteit Leuven(KUL) has organized this by including an option of Islamic theology and religious studies in aone-year masters course in world religions,interreligious dialogue and religious studies.T his option makes available abasic training in Islamic theologyand religious studies.Itisparticularly envisaged for Muslimcounselors and teachers of Islamic religious education but is definitely not at raining course for imams or ac omplete academic program in Islamictheology and religiousstudies.
Political initiativesinthe Wallonia-Brussels Federation
Theq uestion of training for Musliml eadersw as on the political agenda of the government of the Wallonia-Brussels Federation during 2009-2014. Theg overnment proceeded in the same way as the Flemishgovernment. In the courseof their term of office, they commissioned af easibility study with av iew to "the creationofapublicinstitute for Islamic studies" (Husson/Mandrin 2014) . Forthe government, this institute would be intended for imams and teachers of Islamic religious educationa nd would be responsible for delivering ar eligious training course integrating the values of equality and liberty.T he report presented areview of the existing courses and formulatedv arious possible scenarios fort he future.Itadvocated "the emergence of aEuropean(or Belgian) Islam". Thereport emphasized the necessity for atraining course for Muslimleadership to cover the religious aspect and social and civic aspect, including language classes.O ne of the preferredr outes would be an interdisciplinary masters includingone or moreuniversity certificates and aprofessional development program. This mastersc ould be jointly organized by various universities in the Wallonia-Brussels federation and coordinated by apermanent body (an NGO or apublic body). This routeishowever only achievable with the involvementofthe Muslim communities,a nd in particular the MEB,a nd with due respectt ot he academic freedom of the universities.O nt his basis,t he government set up a commission made up of representatives of the universities,e xperts,a nd repre-sentatives of Muslim communities drawn from the MEB.U nlike the Flemish commission, there were no members of ministerial cabinets included.The work of the commission will be completedinNovember 2015. Thedebates have followed similar lines to those in Flanders:step-wise development towards the goal of an autonomous training institutiona nd development of projects in collaboration between the MEBand the universities,especially UCL, whichhas been working in this area for along time.
Religion as security issue
TheC onstitution enshrines the settlement between the state and religions.A lthoughw ea re no longer in the era of "policingo fr eligions" (Boudon 2002) , multiple political actions and declarations show that in the specific case of Islam, religious questionsa re treated as security matters.O nt he occasiono fv arious sometimes tragic events such as the killing committed at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014, but also the departure of young Muslims to fight in Syria in 2013, the incitement to hatred promoted by the group Sharia4Belgium in 2013, the Muslim radicalization in the prisons in 2013, and the expression of Muslim radicalism following the killing at Charlie Hebdoi n2 015, political responses have been hardline and security-oriented. Thesuspicion with regard to the teaching of some radical imamshas been expressed explicitly and the state,while recognizing that it cannot comment on the religious content of sermons,reaffirmsthat these may not express ideas contrary to the law and the Constitution.T raining for imams is considered as an instrument with which to combat Muslim fundamentalism and radicalism, especially among the young.Thus the training of imams is part of al ogic of security and not one of raising theire ducational standards (FrØgosi 2004; Z emni 2006) . Fort he political authorities,t hese political actions and declarations do not infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of state and religion. Indeed, this separation is only achievablei ft wo of the conditions it is based upon are respected:religions must secure "public order" and "religious peace". Theevents which have taken place in Belgium and in Europe lead to the view that thesec onditions are not fulfilled. This justifiesp ublic intervention and aresponse in terms of internal state security.T othis is added the argument advanced by the Council of Elders which maintains that thes tate is entitled to expect professional standards of ministers of religion in their work of moral assistance, in exchange for the payment of their salaries.
Since the events of Charlie Hebdo,t he federal state and the regions have implemented programs to combat radicalism. Public interventionism has also been marked at the regional level, responsible for the recognition of mosquesand for leadership training. Comparison between the policies of Flanders and of Wallonia-Brussels reveals the same opposition as that observed by Ilke Adam (2013) in the matter of immigrant integration. Thepolicy is moreinterventionist in Flanders and more laisser-faire in the francophone part of the country. The security component of the policy is seen in Flanders in the law for the recognition of places of worship.T hus,o ne of the criteria for recognition is that the local community should reject any individual who acts in violationofthe Constitution or of the Convention for the Protection of HumanR ights and Fundamental Freedoms.This criterionisnot presentinthe laws of the Brussels Capital Region and the Walloon Region. Likewise,imams who do not have Belgian citizenship must participateinthe mandatory integration program in Flanders.This too is a criterion for the recognition of aplace of worship.The dimension of assimilation is much more strongly emphasized in public discourse in Flanders,w here lack of knowledge of the Dutch language is am ajor problem among the imams,a lso denouncedb yi mamss uch as Brahim Laytouss 13 ,a dding to the justification for public intervention.
Theinitiatives takenbythe Flemish and francophone governments have often been criticized on the groundsofthe lack of respectfor the separation of state and religion, especially on the francophone side.F or example,t he Islam specialist Felice Dassetto (2014) wrote on his blog that the project in the Wallonia-Brussels federation revives the "Josephinist policy"o fr eligion which contravenes the principle of the separation of state and religion. Jean-PhilippeSchreiber( 2015) founder of amasters in studies of religions and secularism at the UniversitØ libre de Bruxelles(ULB) sharesthe same analysis and describes the project as "neogallicanism". In contrast,s ome Muslim elites have celebrated the public interventionand formulatedradical proposals (mandatory recognition for all mosques, preachingonly in the official languages of Belgium, university qualificationsfor all imams, etc.)toconstruct aBelgian Islam for which one of the objectivesisto end the superintendence that somef oreign countries exerciseo ver Belgian mosques. Public interventionism is also made possible by the climate of Islamophobia, by the fragmentation of the Muslim community and the institutional fragility of the MEB.I slam is am inority religion and one that is strongly marginalized in the context of multiple controversies (veil, reasonable accommodation,etc.) . In this context, it is difficult to propose an alternative to the discourse of security formulated by the political authorities and supported by public opinion. Thes urveillance practices, such as screening, have also generated distrust of the political authorities within the Muslimc ommunities.I na ddition, as noted by Farid El Asri 14 ,the "prominenceofsecurity" in political discourse and action leads Muslims to feel that they are the victims of discrimination and creates distrust towards any political initiative coming from above.
13 Het Nieuwsblad,19/01/2015. 14 El Asri, F. (2013, 10 septembre). "La formation des imamsenBelgique:pas si vite!" in La Libre Belgique.10S eptember 2013, available at http://www.lalibre.be/debats/ opinions/la-formation-des-imams-en-belgique-pas-si-vite-522e947235703d8e48d3f2b1.
Thef ragmentation of the Muslimc ommunity stems from the diversityo fi ts religious and national roots.There are Muslim communities which have grown up from the grassroots,i nl ocalc ommunities.T hese communities also embracea wide diversity of religious practice as well as adiversityofexpectations,especially on the part of the imams, who vary ag reat deal. They ounger generations of Muslims are moreeducated than their parents.T heir expectationsofthe imams are much higher. They are searching for an intense spirituality that they do not always find in the mosques (Husson/Mandrin 2014; T orrekens /Adam 2015) , or in imamswho have had alimitededucation in Islamicreligious studies,orinthose offeringadogmatic approach to the faith.T hey are lookingfor imamswho understand the dailylives of their faithful and respond to their preoccupations. Some Muslims alsoexpectimamstohave the skills to get involved in the life of society (Mukadam /Scoot-Baumann 2010) and in socialorganization (Jouanneau 2013) . Finally,there is also astrongexpectation of adeep knowledge of scripture and of the contextualization of Islam in Europe.These expectations showthe existence of anothercleavage in the Muslim communities:agenerational cleavage.These multiple cleavages dividingt he Muslim communities make it more difficult to construct aconsensual ideal of what an imam should be and how he/sheshould be trained.
Finally,political interventionism is also aresult of the weak legitimacy of the MEB.T he successive crises within the MEB especially at the time of the 2005 elections have weakened its power and its credibility among the Muslim communities and in respectofthe political authorities.While the 2014 elections were calmer,t he fact that as ignificant number of members of the MEB come from unrecognized mosques or mosques that chose to remain unrecognized raises questions.T he MEBw ants to get away fromi ts paternalist reputation but has difficulty in formulating aplan for training which couldberecognized by the state. This is due to the total lack of consensus within the MEBo nt his subject. The president of the MEB wanted the subject of imams training to be excluded from the debates of the commissions (Schreiber 2015) which were set up in Flanders and Wallonia-Brussels,whereas the president of the Congregation of Muslims in Belgium (Dassetto2 014) was pleased that it was included. But the deepest internal division is that between the Moroccans and the Turks.T he Moroccan representatives want au niversity faculty of Islamic studies which would also maintain contacts with the universities of the Arab world,w hereast he Turkish representatives linked to the Diyanetdonot want this.The latter are satisfied with the currentsituation whereby imams,even young Tu rks born in Belgium,follow training courses in Tu rkey and are then paid by the Turkish state for their work in the role of imam.T his internal dissensionh as caused deadlock and creates the opportunity for state intervention.This shows again the weight of the countries of origin on this sensitive question of imamstraining.
Conclusion
Thetraining of Muslim leadership,and above all of imams,isabig issue in Europe. Theproposals that are currently emergingfrom the initiatives takenbythe Belgian political authorities in collaboration with the MEB and the universities are leadingtowards training programs for Muslim leadership,with the exception of imams.T his is ultimately fairly similart ow hat has happened in France (Strasbourg,Paris,and Bordeaux). These are generaltraining courses aimingtogive an understanding of Islam but none of them is auniversity-level course for imams. There are two other models in Europe:the German modeland the Dutch model (Messner 2015; F uess 2011 ;H euts /K laver /V an der welle 2012). TheG erman model consists in creating institutes of Muslim theology within the university, offeringb achelors and mastersd egree courses.A ts omeG erman universities, endowed chairsfor Islamic theology are financed by third parties,among them the Tu rkish governmental council for religious affairs.T his limits chances for the emergence of aE uropean Islam because of its dependence on the countryo f origin. TheDutchmodel consists in offering afull university program put together in collaboration with Islamic associations but not with the representatives of Islamicc ommunities.I ft he programs are too general, this can lead Muslims to discredit the model and turn to other training programs. Theplans in Belgium are navigating between these two approaches.
Whichever modelischosen,there remains an essential problem which should not be lost from view during the construction of atraining program for imams. The trainingofimamsdoes not lead them automaticallytobeappointed to aposition. As for Protestants and Jews,and in contrast to Catholics, it is local communities whochoose their ministers of religion and not the religious hierarchy which in fact does not exist. Even if acandidate imam has followed atraining courserecognized by the representative leadership body and the state,hestill hastobeaccepted by the faithful. Therefore all plans for training for imamsa bsolutely must take account of the expectations of local communities and of the faithful.
